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AN INSTITUTIONAL ALCHEMY:
INDIA’S TWO PARLIAMENTS IN
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
Shubhankar Dam*
INTRODUCTION: THE PRESIDENT AS THE SOLE LEGISLATOR

J

yoti Singh Pandey, a twenty-three-year-old physiotherapy
intern, was gang raped in New Delhi on December 16,
2012.1 Six men were involved, one of them a teenager. Their
assault left Jyoti with grave injuries to her abdomen, intestines, and genitals.2 The teenager was the most ferocious of the
six men. He raped his victim twice and “ripped out her intestines with his bare hands.”3 This display of hypersexualized
* Shubhankar Dam, Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management
University School of Law; LL.M. (Harvard); B.C.L. (Oxon). Former law clerk
to Hon. Mr. V. N. Khare, Chief Justice of India, Indian Supreme Court. SMU
Office of Research provided funding for this paper. Versions of this Article
were presented at the Boston Law and Society Annual Meeting 2013 and the
Inaugural Young Scholars Workshop on Socio-legal Studies, National University Singapore Law Faculty, 2013. Gary Bell, Malcolm Feeley, Andrew
Harding, Tom Ginsburg, Swagata Raha, and the conference participants provided valuable feedback. Katelyn Ciolino, Thomas Slattery, and their team of
editors provided excellent editorial assistance. I am grateful to them. The
usual rejoinder applies.
1. Raj Shekhar & Dwaipayan Ghosh, Girl Gang-Raped in Moving Bus in
INDIA
(Dec.
17,
2012),
Delhi,
TIMES
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-12-17/delhi/35868316_1_busmahipalpur-new-delhi; Wieland Wagner, ‘The Fearless One’: Rape Trial GalSPIEGEL
(Aug.
20,
2013),
vanizes
India,
DER
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/jyoti-singh-pandey-nirbhaya-rapetrial-brings-india-together-a-917401.html. The four adult defendants were
sentenced to death by hanging in September 2013. Ellen Barry, Many Doubt
Death Sentences Will Stem India Sexual Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/world/asia/4-sentenced-to-death-in-rapecase-that-riveted-india.html.
2. Savagery Shames City, MAIL TODAY (Dec. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SAVAGERY+SHAMES+CITY.-a0312332626.
3. Jatin Anand, Dehli Rape: Juvenile Raped Woman Twice and Ripped off
TIMES
(Jan.
3,
2013),
Her
Intestine,
HINDUSTAN
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/chunk-ht-ui-indiasectionpagedelhigangrape/delhi-rape-juvenile-raped-woman-twice-and-ripped-off-herintestine/article1-984188.aspx. He was found guilty in August 2013. Delhi
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brutality enraged parts of India. Protests erupted.4 Thousands
descended onto the streets of New Delhi demanding a prompt
trial of the accused persons and better protection for women in
the capital city.5 Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh appealed for calm.6 He tasked a committee to recommend legislative changes to sternly deal with incidents of sexual assault.7
With the former Chief Justice of India, J. S. Verma, at its helm,
the committee promptly produced a report that counseled several changes to criminal law in India.8 Partly based on these
recommendations, President Pranab Mukherjee promulgated a
piece of legislation amending the law against sexual assaults
and instituted the death penalty for rape.9 How could the president amend the criminal code and introduce new punishments
all by himself? This Article is about India’s “Alternative Parliament”—an arrangement under which the president may independently enact legislation.10

Gang Rape: Teenager Found Guilty, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-23908176.
4. Dean Nelson, Gang Rape of Indian Woman Sparks Mass Protests,
(Dec.
19,
2012),
TELEGRAPH
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9755913/Gang-rapeof-Indian-woman-sparks-mass-protests.html.
5. Jason Burke, Delhi Bus Gang Rape: ‘What Is Going Wrong with Our
(Dec.
19,
2012),
Society?,’
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/19/delhi-bus-gang-rape.
6. Jason Burke, India Gang Rape Protests: Manmohan Singh Appeals for
(Dec.
24.
2012),
Calm,
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/24/inadian-gang-rape-protestsmanmohan-singh.
7. Justice Verma Committee Gets to Work; Seeks Public Comments, DNA
INDIA (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-delhi-gang-rapejustice-verma-committee-gets-to-work-seeks-public-comments-1781257.
8. Verma Panel for Stiffer Punishment to Rapists but No Death, NEW
INDIAN
EXPRESS
(Jan.
24,
2013),
http://newindianexpress.com/nation/article1432575.ece.
9. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013 (3 of 2013), available
at http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/criminalLawAmndmt-040213.pdf; B. Muralidhar
Reddy, Despite Protest, Ordinance on Sexual Offences Promulgated, HINDU
(Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/despite-protestordinance-on-sexual-offences-promulgated/article4375214.ece. The Verma
Committee, it should be mentioned, did not recommend the death penalty. In
fact, the suggestion was categorically rejected.
10. Formally speaking, India’s Parliament is made up of three organs: the
president, the Council of States (Upper House), and the House of the People
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India has a parliamentary system, but articled in India’s
Constitution is a provision that authorizes the president to enact legislation without involving Parliament. Such presidential
legislation is called an “ordinance” not an act, and rather than
enact, the president “promulgates” it. At the federal level, the
mechanism is provided for in Article 123:11
(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are
in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist
which render it necessary for him to take immediate action,
he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances
appear
to
him
to
require.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have
the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every
such Ordinance (a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and
shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks
from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the
expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it
are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the
second of those resolutions; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.
Explanation: Where the Houses of Parliament are summoned
to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall
be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of
this
clause.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any
provision which Parliament would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.

Five features are worth highlighting. First, ordinances may
be promulgated only if at least one House of Parliament is not
in session. Second, though nominally granted to the president,
the power to promulgate ordinances, in practice, is exercised by
the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers decides if an
ordinance is necessary. It also drafts the ordinance, but the
president formally promulgates it into effect. While the president has some discretion in this regard, the scope of that discretion still remains unclear. Third, ordinances are temporary
(Lower House). See INDIA CONST. art. 79. In this Article, Parliament is referred to in its nontechnical sense; that is, to the two Houses of Parliament.
11. At the state level, governors too enjoy similar powers. See INDIA CONST.
art. 213.
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measures and remain in force until the expiry of six weeks
from the commencement of the next legislative session.12
Fourth, ordinances are like parliamentary legislation: they
have the “same force and effect.”13 They are not rules, orders,
bylaws, or delegated legislation of some other kind. Rather,
they are legislation proper. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, ordinances and acts have similar substantive width.14 The
president may use an ordinance to do all the things Parliament
may do through an act.
Ordinances have a large presence in India. Originally a British innovation, they matured into India’s legislative design
over time15 and their prominence has only grown postindependence. Between 1952 and 2009, presidents promulgated
615 ordinances at an average of 10.5 every year.16 During the
same period, Parliament enacted 3467 acts.17 In other words,
approximately 17.7% of all acts originated as ordinances. But
their importance goes beyond numbers: some of India’s most
controversial policies were initially legislated through ordinances. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, perfected this practice—he nationalized industries and enacted
anti-terror legislation using ordinances.18 His successors zealously followed him in this respect. The mechanism has since
been used to introduce legislation in many fields including
crime,19 human rights,20 finance,21 national security,22 property,23 religion,24 and taxation.25

12.
13.
14.
15.

INDIA CONST. art. 123(2).
Id. art. 123(2).
Id. art. 123(3).
For a description of this evolution, see SHUBHANKAR DAM,
PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATION IN INDIA: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ORDINANCES
27–65 (2014).
16. See PRESIDENTIAL ORDINANCES, 1950–2009 (2011).
17. STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 52
(2012), http://mpa.nic.in/Statbook12.pdf (India) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
HANDBOOK].
18. See, e.g., Life Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1956, No.
1 of 1956, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (Jan. 19, 1956);
Armed Forces (Assam & Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance, 1958, No. 1 of
1958, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (May 22, 1958).
19. See, e.g., Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Ordinance, 1966, No. 6 of
1966, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (June 17, 1966).
20. See, e.g., Protection of Human Rights Act, No. 30 of 1993, INDIA CODE.
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Ordinances are bounded by several “controls.” First, procedurally, they are limited to circumstances when at least one
House of Parliament is not in session. Substantively, the president—technically with the approval of the Council of Ministers—must be satisfied that circumstances necessitate immediate action of this kind. A second control applies postpromulgation. Ordinances are temporary in nature. To become
permanent, they must be enacted into law within a specified
period. Without such formal parliamentary approval, ordinances “cease to exist.”26 This is the third control. These controls
taken together suggest that parliamentary legislation and
presidential legislation do not stand on the same footing. More
importantly, it implies that parliamentary preeminence is still
part of India’s legislative design. But that is not so. After sixty
years of constitutional practice these controls are redundant;
aggressive political conduct and forgiving judicial interpretations made them so. What was exceptional and temporary is
now normal and permanent. As a result, India effectively has
two “Parliaments”—thus, the president acts as an “Alternative
Parliament.”27
This Article explains this great Indian alchemy—how and
why this transformation occurred, and its implications for India’s parliamentary system. It is divided into four parts. Part I
tackles the preconditions essential for an ordinance. It argues
21. See, e.g., Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, No. 6 of 1976, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (June 16, 1976) .
22. See, e.g., Maintenance of Internal Security Ordinance, 1971, No. 5 of
1971, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (May 7, 1971).
23. See, e.g., Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, 1969, No. 8 of 1969, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (July 19, 1969).
24. See, e.g., Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid (Acquisition of Area) Ordinance, 1990, No. 9 of 1990, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1)
(Oct. 19, 1990).
25. See, e.g., Compulsory Deposit Scheme (Income-Tax Payers) Ordinance,
1974, No. 10 of 1974, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1) (July 17,
1974).
26. INDIA CONST. art. 123(2)(a).
27. The reference to this second Parliament must be understood in a limited sense. Arguably, parliaments do much more than merely legislate. To
say that India’s president effectively functions as an alternative Parliament
is to suggest that the president legislates in the same way that Parliament
does.
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that without any judicial oversight, these conditions are largely
hollow. Part II is about options post-promulgation and offers an
overview of how Parliament has responded to the 615 ordinances thus far. It then focuses on the legality of repromulgating ordinances. Part III is an analysis of the final control;
namely, the requirement that a failed ordinance “ceases to operate.” It argues that by effectively writing off this requirement, the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) has completed this institutional metamorphosis. Finally, Part IV draws
upon political science literature and comparative experiences
from Latin America and Europe to explain how this second Indian Parliament is different from those commonly associated
with presidential jurisdictions.
I. KEEPING PARLIAMENT AWAY: THE CONDITIONS THAT MAKE
ORDINANCES POSSIBLE
Two—and only two—conditions must be met before the president may promulgate an ordinance. This section discusses
both of these conditions, assesses their complexities, and revisits judicial opinions about them. It argues that the Constitution
set a low threshold, and the courts lowered it further. As a result, the conditions are, legally speaking, only about form; substantively, they are hollow.
A. Shades of Absence: When Is Parliament “Not in Session”?
Article 123(1) says that the president may promulgate an ordinance except when “both Houses of Parliament are in session.” Notice the emphasis on “both Houses.” It suggests that
ordinances are not meant for occasions when legislation is “institutionally” possible. Stated differently, Article 123 does not
establish a parallel legislative process. Rather, it empowers the
president to enact ordinances when at least one House of Parliament is not in session. But when is Parliament “not in session?” The question, it turns out, is easier than the answer.
The Constitution does not prescribe the periods for which the
two Houses should be in session. It merely states that “six
months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session.”28 Conventionally, the two Houses meet for three sessions
28. INDIA CONST. art. 85(1) (“The President shall from time to time summon each House of Parliament to meet at such time and place as he thinks
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annually: the “budget session” runs from February to May; the
“monsoon session” runs from July to September, and the “winter session” runs from November to December.29 While Article
85 authorizes the president to “summon each House of Parliament,” in practice, decisions regarding commencement and duration of sessions are made by the Cabinet.30 And once summoned, a House may be brought to a close by several means—it
may be adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved.
Adjournment is a break in parliamentary proceedings; it
postpones the business of a House to another time or date in
the same session.31 Such breaks may range from short periods—including just a few hours—to several weeks. In India,
presiding officers often adjourn Houses when members are disruptive, or ordinary business cannot be transacted.32 A notice of
adjournment usually includes a statement of the date and time
when a House will reassemble, unless it is sine die, in which
case there is no assurance that the House will meet again during that session.33 In contrast, prorogation is a break in parliamentary proceedings that signals the end of a session.34 It
may occur at any time either after adjournment or while a
House is in session. The decision to prorogue is generally made
by the Cabinet and notified by the president.35 Once prorogued,
fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session
and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session.”).
29. LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT, Composition, Business, and Procedure, in
HANDBOOK FOR MEMBERS OF LOK SABHA 2 (15th ed. 2009), available at
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/Members/handbook.aspx
[hereinafter
LOK
SABHA HANDBOOK]; see also V.K. AGNIHOTRI, HANDBOOK ON THE WORKING OF
MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 17–18 (2004).
30. For a description of the procedure, see AGNIHOTRI, supra note 29, at 17,
19–22.
31. In the Matter of Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 237, ¶
52 (India) [hereinafter Reference by President].
32. Unfortunately, this pattern is all too common. See, e.g., Parliament
Paralysed for Third Consecutive Day, NDTV NEWS (Nov. 24, 2011, 3:56 PM),
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/Parliament-paralysed-for-thirdconsecutive-day-152607; Houses Adjourned over Nandigram Deadlock,
EXPRESS
(Nov.
20,
2007,
12:56
AM),
INDIAN
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/houses-adjourned-over-nandigramdeadlock/241115/.
33. LOK SABHA HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 28, 77.
34. Id. at 76.
35. See generally A.R. MUKHERJEA, PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE IN INDIA
61–65 (1983).
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only the president may recall a House back to session; a speaker or chairperson of a House is not authorized to do so. This is a
key difference. If adjourned sine die, a House is still in session
and the presiding officer may bring it back into session.36 It is
not so if a House has been prorogued.
But adjournment and prorogation are similar in one respect.
Neither adjournment nor prorogation precludes the possibility
of future sessions and, therefore, unfinished business from a
prorogued session does not lapse.37 A prorogued House, in other
words, is inactive but “alive.”38 Finally, dissolution signals the
end—or “death”—of a particular House, thereby necessitating
new elections. All pending matters, including bills, lapse on
dissolution.39 Interestingly, while both the Lower and Upper
Houses may be adjourned or prorogued, only the Lower House
can be dissolved in India.40 Once dissolved, it cannot be revived.41
To summarize, once summoned to meet, both Houses of Parliament may be brought to a close in a number of ways. An adjournment ends a particular sitting of Parliament. Prorogation
ends a particular session of Parliament. Dissolution ends that
Parliament—namely, the Lower House itself.42 These distinctions are important because they determine when an ordinance
may be promulgated. Recall the temporal limits in Article
123(1): “at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament
are in session,” the president may promulgate ordinances.43
36. This has happened on a number of occasions. On May 25, 1987, the
Lower House was adjourned sine die to mark the end of the budget session.
But the house was never prorogued. Accordingly, on July 27 it met again for
the monsoon session, which was, legally speaking, a continuation of its earlier session. On July 28, the speaker adjourned the house sine die and on September 3 it was finally prorogued by the president. See STATISTICAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 10–25.
37. Reference by President, supra note 31, ¶ 52.
38. Id. ¶ 53. That is unless the prorogation coincides with the House’s
maximum tenure.
39. Id. ¶ 52.
40. The Upper House, consistent with Article 83, is a permanent body.
INDIA CONST. art. 83(1) (“The Council of States shall not be subject to dissolution, but as nearly as possible one third of the members thereof shall retire as
soon as may be on the expiration of every second year in accordance with the
provisions made in that behalf by Parliament by law.”).
41. Reference by President, supra note 31, ¶ 52.
42. See also MUKHERJEA, supra note 35, at 61–65.
43. INDIA CONST. art. 123(1) (emphasis added).
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Our earlier distinctions make it clear that Parliament is not in
session when either House stands prorogued or the Lower
House stands dissolved. Clearly ordinances may be promulgated then.
But if Parliament is in sitting, or in session but not in sitting,
the only way for a Cabinet to promulgate an ordinance is to
prorogue either House, or dissolve the Lower House. Improper
as it sounds, Cabinets have resorted to this method—or attempted to do so—on several occasions. The 2006 controversy
surrounding Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and her alleged “office of profit” is instructive here.44 In June 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Cabinet created the National Advisory
Council (“NAC”)—apparently to oversee the implementation of
the Common Minimum Program to which the coalition partners of the United Progressive Alliance had agreed. Mrs. Gandhi, as the president of the Congress Party, was appointed its
chairperson. She enjoyed the rank and status of a cabinet minister and received perks and benefits paid out by the central
government.45 In March 2006, the National Democratic Alliance-led opposition questioned Mrs. Gandhi’s appointment, alleging that it amounted to an “office of profit” under Article
102—something that disqualified her from membership to either House of Parliament.46 Unable to find fault with the opposition’s legal arguments, the Cabinet secretly came up with a
draft ordinance to remove Mrs. Gandhi’s disqualifications under the relevant legislation.47 But the two Houses were in ses44. See generally DAM, supra note 15.
45. See The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Act,
No. 31 of 2006, INDIA CODE (2006).
46. INDIA CONST. art. 102(1)(a).
A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a
member of either House of Parliament if he holds any office of profit
under the Government of India or the Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its
holder.
Id. Earlier in Day, BJP Spelt Out Her Office of Profit, Indian Express (Mar.
23, 2006), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/earlier-in-day-bjp-spelt-outher-office-of-profit/1040/0; Neena Vyas, Adjournment Aimed at ‘Saving’
Sonia, Hindu (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tpnational/adjournment-aimed-at-saving-sonia/article3168149.ece.
47. Vyas, supra note 46; R. Venkataraman, Stop Office-of-Profit Axe, UPA
Gets Ordinance, INDIAN EXPRESS (Mar. 21, 2006, 4:21 AM),
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/to-stop-officeofprofit-axe-upa-gets-
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sion and that created a hurdle. The Cabinet asked the speaker
to adjourn the Lower House sine die and recommended to the
president that it be prorogued.48 But the ordinance did not materialize. An alert piece of reporting by the Indian Express
made those plans public, and an embarrassed Cabinet backtracked.49 Eventually, Mrs. Gandhi resigned, only to be reelected, and a later piece of legislation regularized her NAC
appointment.50
This sort of legislative maneuvering has an obvious air of impropriety. But are there legal limits to how and when the executive may prorogue parliamentary sessions to make way for
ordinances? The Madras High Court in In Re Kalyanam
Veerabhadraya determined that there are not.51 In July 1949,
the Madras Legislative Assembly was in the process of debating several amendments to the Madras Maintenance of Public
Order Act, 1947.52 Despite that, the governor prorogued the
session and promulgated an ordinance—the Madras Ordinance, 1949—on the grounds that “immediate action was necessary.”53 The petitioners argued that the governor’s action was
a fraudulent exercise of power: there was no urgency, and the
legislature was prorogued solely to make an ordinance possible.54 The High Court rebuffed that claim.
It is open to the Governor to prorogue the legislature at any
time he pleases. We do not see anything wrong in the Goverordinance-/922/; see The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, No.
10 of 1959, INDIA CODE (1959).
48. Uproar in Parliament over Ordinance ‘Shielding’ Sonia, HINDUSTAN
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2006, 4:00 PM), http://www.hindustantimes.com/NewsFeed/NM8/Uproar-in-Parliament-over-ordinance-shielding-Sonia/Article177777.aspx.
49. Venkataraman, supra note 47.
50. The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, No. 10 of 1959,
INDIA CODE (1959); Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, A Masterstroke, 23 FRONTLINE,
Mar.
25–Apr.
7,
2006,
available
at
http://hindu.com/fline/fl2306/stories/20060407007212900.htm; Sonia Gandhi
NEWS
(May
8,
2006),
Runs
for
Re-election,
BBC
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4983682.stm; see also Sujay Mehdudia,
President Kalam Signs Office of Profit Bill, HINDU (Sept. 19, 2006),
http://www.hindu.com/2006/09/19/stories/2006091922020300.htm.
51. In re Kalyanam Veerabhadrayya, A.I.R. 1950 (Mad.) 243, ¶ 21 (1949)
(India).
52. The Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, No. 1 of 1947 (India).
53. Madras Ordinance, 1949, No. 1 of 1949 (India).
54. In re Kalyanam Veerabhadrayya, supra note 51, ¶ 21.
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nor proroguing the Assembly and the Council with a view to
enable himself to issue an Ordinance. The legislature . . . is
very slow to move in the matter of legislation and if the Governor has reasons to believe that immediate action is necessary, it [can] be more expedient to have resort to the power of
issuing an Ordinance . . . rather than approach the Legislature for the necessary legislation.55

In other words, the power to prorogue is absolute; the executive may invoke it at any time and for any reason. Even if done
solely to make an ordinance possible—as in the office of profit
controversy—the High Court seemed to suggest that it too
would be lawful.
This absolute reading of prorogation was somewhat disputed
in State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang.56 The facts of the case are
peculiar. During the budget session in March 1968, a resolution
expressing no-confidence in the speaker was moved in the Punjab State Assembly.57 The next day, the speaker declared the
motion unconstitutional and deemed not to have been moved.
He then adjourned the Assembly for two months until May 6,
1968.58 This led to a crisis. The state budget had a March 31
deadline, but the Assembly stood adjourned until May. With
the speaker unwilling to resume legislative proceedings, the
governor prorogued the Assembly and promulgated the Punjab
Legislature Regulation of Procedure in Relation to Financial
Business Ordinance, 1968.59 It barred both Houses of the State
Legislature from being adjourned without consent until the
completion of the financial business.60 When challenged on the
ground that the Houses were prorogued solely to make way for
an ordinance, the Court sided with the governor. “There was no
abuse of power by him, nor can his action be described as mala
fide,” Chief Justice Hidayatullah wrote.61 But he hedged on the
larger question:

55. Id.
56. State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 903 (1968) (India).
57. Id. at 907.
58. Id.
59. The Punjab Legislature (Regulation of Procedure in relation to Financial Business) Ordinance, 1968, No. 1 of 1968.
60. Id. § 3.
61. State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 903, ¶ 14 (1968)
(India).
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Whether a Governor will be justified to do this when the Legislature is in session and in the midst of its legislative work is
a question that does not fall for consideration here. When that
happens, the motives of the Governor may conceivably be
questioned on the ground of an alleged want of good faith and
abuse of constitutional powers.62

Satya Pal Dang is less sweeping than the view articulated by
the Madras High Court, and if correct, would imply that presidents (and governors) do not have complete discretion in proroguing Houses. Nonetheless, both decisions and their general
tenor err on the side of wide discretion and that has stark implications for Article 123. If the decision to prorogue a parliamentary session is entirely—or substantially—within the discretion of a Cabinet, it follows that the temporal limit in Article
123 does not impose any meaningful restriction. The executive
may satisfy the “not in session” requirement simply by proroguing a House when it is in session.
B. Whimsically Legal: Measuring Presidential Satisfaction
The first control has a second leg that must also be met before Article 123 can be invoked. The president must be satisfied
“that circumstances exist that render it necessary for him to
take immediate action.”63 In other words, at least one House of
Parliament must not be in session, and the president must be
satisfied that the circumstances demand an immediate parliamentary response. This latter condition—the emphasis on
“immediate action”—reiterates the idea that the arrangement
did not establish a parallel Parliament. As mentioned earlier,
the power to promulgate ordinances is nominally vested in the
president; in practice, it is exercised by the Cabinet. If the latter decides that an ordinance is immediately necessary, the
president promulgates it into law. But such decisions may be
made for reasons other than the fact that it is, legislatively
speaking, immediately necessary. The dramatic circumstances
under which banks were nationalized in 1969 illustrate this.
When India’s second Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri
unexpectedly died in office in 1966, the ruling Congress Party
turned to Mrs. Indira Gandhi to lead the nation. At forty-eight,
she was young, charismatic, and—as the daughter of India’s
62. Id.
63. INDIA CONST. art. 123(1).
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longest serving Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru—widely
admired.64 She led her party to its fourth victory in the General
Elections in 1967 but with a reduced majority.65 Soon, her position became suspect as senior—and more conservative—leaders
openly defied her.66 In a shrewd move, Mrs. Gandhi allied herself with the younger, socialist faction of her party. The clash of
personalities became ideological as a result and turned in her
favor.67 She unveiled an aggressive socialist agenda, matching
it with powerful rhetoric both inside and outside Parliament.
But an agenda was not enough; Mrs. Gandhi had to act.
On the evening of July 18, 1969, a senior draftsman from the
Law Ministry, S. K. Maitra, was ordered by the Prime Minister’s Secretariat to draft an ordinance nationalizing fourteen of
India’s biggest commercial banks.68 The matter was top secret,
and only a handful of bureaucrats were privy to the drafting
process. Mrs. Gandhi looked through the draft early the next
morning and made minor modifications.69 Later approved unopposed by a Cabinet that had neither seen nor heard about it
earlier, the ordinance was sent to then Acting President V. V.
Giri who signed it into law.70 “By a mere stroke of the pen the
Government [took] control of the deposits of 14 banks, totaling
. . . nearly 70 percent of the aggregate amount of deposits under the banking system.”71 A day later, Parliament came back
to session.72
The Prime Minister’s action invited sharp criticisms. M. R.
Masani and C. Rajagopalachari, leaders of the free-market
Swatantra Party, criticized the takeover, and not just for policy
reasons. They argued that an ordinance a day before Parlia64. RAMCHANDRA GUHA, INDIA AFTER GANDHI 405–06 (2007).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 435–38.
67. Id.; see also GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:
THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 176–79 (1st ed. 1999).
68. AUSTIN, supra note 67, at 214–15.
69. Id.
70. The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)
Ordinance, 1969, No. 3 of 1969, Gazette of India (Extraordinary), section II(1)
(July 19, 1969) (India).
71. Top Fourteen Banks Are Nationalised, TIMES INDIA, July 20, 1969, at 1.
72. Decisions regarding the start and closing of parliamentary sessions are
conventionally made by the Council of Ministers in consultation with the
speakers of the two houses and the opposition parties. The dates and the parliamentary agenda are agreed upon well in advance of the actual sessions.
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ment was to convene “was immoral.”73 A. B. Vajpayee, then
president of the conservative Jan Sangh Party, made a similar
point. He stated that imposing a far-reaching decision on the
nation “through the backdoor of an ordinance and that too just
on the eve of the Parliament session is in itself proof that the
Government is afraid of facing Parliament in a straightforward
manner.”74 The criticisms mattered little though. As the Times
of India editorial put it, “the die [was] cast.”75 While ordinances
in Article 123 are temporary measures that eventually require
formal parliamentary approval, by 1969, in practice, there was
clearly no going back after promulgation.76 Ordinances by then
had acquired a firm quality; once promulgated, it only had the
effect of tying Parliament’s hand.
Examined in context, bank nationalization for Mrs. Gandhi
was a vehicle by which to cement herself as the leader of the
government and the party.77 Legislative urgency, if any, was
“political” and tied to machinations within the Congress Party.
As such, was the reliance on Article 123 justified? Rustom C.
Cooper, a shareholder in one of the nationalized banks, did not
think so. He challenged the ordinance in the Supreme Court.78
He argued that the nationalization ordinance was contrary to
Article 123 because the president—acting on the advice of the
Council of Ministers—wrongly came to the conclusion that immediate action was necessary. His larger point was that presidential satisfaction had limits, and ordinances were valid only
if they were promulgated for the “right” reasons.79 The Attorney General took the contrary view, arguing that the decision
to promulgate an ordinance was a “matter of high policy” and
therefore completely immune from judicial review.80 The Union
of India was “under no obligation to disclose the existence of, or
to justify the circumstances of the necessity to take immediate
action,” he insisted.81 The Supreme Court left the matter unde73. C.R. Doubts Validity of Ordinance, TIMES INDIA, July 19, 1969, at 8.
74. UF Circles Hail Bank Nationalisation, TIMES INDIA, July 20, 1969, at 8.
75. The Die Is Cast, TIMES INDIA, July 21, 1969, at 6.
76. This practice eventually earned a legal status when the Supreme
Court ruled that even ordinances that fail to secure parliamentary approval
could create permanent effects. See infra Part III.
77. AUSTIN, supra note 67, at 174.
78. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 530 (India).
79. Id. ¶ 24.
80. Id. ¶ 25.
81. Id.
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cided. By the time hearings began, the ordinance had already
become an Act, and questions about presidential satisfaction in
Article 123 were no longer relevant.82 But the Court’s refusal to
wade into the issue demonstrated the provision’s potential—
especially the many ends for which it could be invoked.
The Court shed its reticence in Nagaraj v. State of Andhra
Pradesh and sided with the executive.83 The governor of the
southern state of Andhra Pradesh promulgated an ordinance
reducing the retirement age of public sector employees from
fifty-eight to fifty-five. The ordinance was challenged, among
other reasons, on the basis that the governor wrongly—and
perhaps with improper motives—came to the conclusion that it
was necessary. The Court rebuffed that argument. A president
(or governor’s) decision to promulgate an ordinance, it said,
was immune from judicial review.84 The Court reached that
conclusion in three steps. First, an ordinance is identical to an
Act.85 Second, when Parliament enacts legislation, it cannot be
accused of having done so “for an extraneous purpose.”86 Even
if the executive, in a given case, has an ulterior motive in introducing a piece of legislation, “that motive cannot render the
passing of the law mala fide.”87 This kind of “transferred malice” was “unknown in the field of legislation.”88 The same is
true of presidents and governors, Chief Justice Chandrachud
claimed; they alone may decide if an ordinance is necessary.
This view was repeated in Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh.89
“The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act,”
Chief Justice Chandrachud once again wrote, “are for the determination of the legislative authority,” not courts.90 Ordinances are like acts, and thus subject to similar restrictions.91
82. The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking)
Act, No. 22 of 1969, INDIA CODE. It should also be noted that the Supreme
Court invalidated the Act on other grounds.
83. Nagaraj v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 551, ¶¶ 28, 37 (India).
84. Id. ¶ 14.
85. Id. ¶ 35.
86. Id. ¶ 36.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 724, ¶ 13–14 (India).
90. Id. ¶ 14.
91. Id.; see also Agarwal v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1956 All. 557, ¶ 22 (India); Tandon v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1960 All. 205, ¶ 9 (India); Pandey v.
Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1970 All. 571, ¶ 20 (India); Bhadra v. Union of India,
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The law regarding presidential satisfaction, therefore, is precisely what Attorney General Niren De argued for in the Bank
Nationalization Case.92 The president may promulgate an ordinance for any reason, and that decision is final. The satisfaction is completely subjective and totally immune from any kind
of judicial scrutiny. Indeed, Cabinets may take to them for personal, political, or whimsical reasons and courts still would not
review the validity of such reasons. As seen earlier, Mrs. Gandhi resorted to an ordinance for “personal” reasons. Her authority was under challenge and the ordinance became a vehicle by which to strengthen her position within the Congress
Party. What other reasons may motivate Cabinets to indulge in
ordinances? The remainder of this section sketches out a typology of motives that can help further an understanding of the
presidential reasons underlying ordinances.
First, as mentioned earlier, ordinances may be promulgated
for personal reasons. Such “preferential” ordinances are principally about the partisan interests of ministers, individually or
collectively, or the party to which the Cabinet belongs. Both
Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s bank ordinance and the proposed, though
ultimately not promulgated, 2006 ordinance aimed at remedying Mrs. Sonia Gandhi’s disqualification are obvious examples.
But they are not the only ones. Perhaps the most egregious of
such partisan ordinances was attempted in 1996. The Narasimha Rao Cabinet was in its “caretaker phase” and the next
general election was two months away.93 The cabinet drafted
two ordinances.94 The first reduced the campaigning period
from three to two weeks.95 The second extended the benefits of
India’s reservation policy to an estimated 12 million lower
caste Christians concentrated in southern India.96 But President S. D. Sharma declined to promulgate them; he felt that

A.I.R. 1975 Cal. 72, ¶ 18 (India); Beebi v. Ravindranathan, A.I.R. 1975 Ker.
202, ¶ 3 (India).
92. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 530 (India).
93. The “caretaker phase” refers to the fact that the Rao Cabinet had completed its tenure and the dates for the next general elections had already
been notified. By convention, governments in India do not make major policy
decisions during this period. The actions of the Rao Cabinet were an exception to this practice.
94. Ordinances Move Assailed, TIMES INDIA, Mar. 17, 1996, at 1.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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“they did not pass the test of constitutional propriety.”97 Perhaps these ordinances were “necessary” only in the sense that
they benefitted the ruling party or persons therein.
Second, cabinets may resort to ordinances to further specific
policy preferences that do not enjoy parliamentary support. Indeed, they may do so because they lack majority support. These
“anti-majoritarian” ordinances are different from partisan ordinances; they do not benefit ministers, individually or collectively, or the ruling party specifically. Instead, they further a
cabinet’s preferences, albeit ones that lack majority support.
The original and the repromulgated versions of the Prevention
of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001 (“POTO”) are good examples. The
Vajpayee Cabinet mooted the idea of an anti-terrorism legislation in the aftermath of the attacks in New York City in 2001.
Some members of the ruling NDA opposed it. They felt that
such a law could target India’s religious minorities and undermine press freedom.98 Fully aware that the proposal enjoyed
insufficient support in Parliament, the cabinet pressed on with
an ordinance.99 Later on, still unable to persuade its coalition
partners, the cabinet repromulgated a slightly altered version
once the relevant session concluded.100 That a parliamentary
majority had rebuffed the need for such a law, even if impliedly, did not matter. The ordinance mechanism became an alibi
through which to enact a piece of legislation despite majority
support against it.
Occasionally, cabinets may promulgate anti-majoritarian ordinances not by choice but under “compulsion.” Consider the
1994 controversy involving India’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”). India became a founding member
of the WTO in 1995 and simultaneously signed the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPs”).101 This latter agreement mandated several changes
97. President Declines Assent to Ordinances, TIMES INDIA, Mar. 20, 1996, at
1.
98. Smita Gupta, Naidu Wants POTO Amended to Protect Press Freedom,
TIMES INDIA, Nov. 18, 2001, at 7.
99. Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, No. 9 of 2001 (India).
100. Prevention of Terrorism (Second) Ordinance, 2001, No. 12 of 2001 (India).
101. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
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to India’s intellectual property laws—especially patent legislation—to meet the new obligations.102 The Narasimha Rao Cabinet had more than eight months during which to evolve a political consensus in favor of these changes. Yet it did nothing.
Later, faced with an impending deadline, the cabinet took the
easy way out. It promulgated an ordinance—The Patents
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1994—on December 31, 1994, proclaiming in the preamble that “it [had] become necessary to
amend the Patents Act, 1970 in conformity with the obligations
under the [TRIPs] Agreement.”103 The move angered the opposition.104 To J. S. Reddy of the Janata Dal, it “was a classic case
of misuse of a constitutional provision,” and “a nasty conspiracy
to confront Parliament with a fait accompli.”105 The cabinet had
foreknowledge of the impending legislative void, and if anything, the urgency was orchestrated by inaction. As the Times
of India editorial put it, rather than make any conciliatory
moves, the government “gambled on the opposition supporting
it to save face abroad.”106 Perhaps it was “necessary” only to
avoid a parliamentary defeat. This was later borne out. The
ordinance was introduced in Parliament in March 1995 only to
be indirectly rejected by the Upper House.107
Third, occasionally cabinets, especially minority cabinets,
may rely on ordinances to legislate systematically. Their minority status implies that they do not have the numeric support
to muscle legislation through Parliament. Thus, Article 123
acts as the crutch through which to churn out new legislation.
This is different from the second reason for promulgating an
ordinance; in the earlier case, the cabinet had a working majorROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
102. For an analysis of the changes required, see Suresh Koshy, Note, The
Effect of TRIPs on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4 (1995).
103. The Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 1994, No. 13 of 1994 (India).
104. Patent Law Amendment Angers Opposition, TIMES INDIA, Jan. 2, 1995,
at 13.
105. Id. The indigenous drug lobby also criticized the move, but mostly for
policy reasons. Patents Act Changes Pique Drug Makers, TIMES INDIA, Jan. 6,
1995, at 19.
106. Patent Myopia, TIMES INDIA, Apr. 1, 1995, at 14.
107. Priya Ranjan Dash, Patent Act Changes Set to Lapse, TIMES INDIA,
Mar. 25, 1995, at 15.
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ity in Parliament but lacked support for a specific piece of legislation. With minority cabinets, the lack of support is more general, and the reliance on ordinances more systematic. We may
refer to them as “substitutive ordinances”; the mechanism almost functions like a parallel Parliament.
H. D. Deve Gowda and Inder K. Gujral and their respective
cabinets best exemplify this. As the leader of the minority
United Front coalition, Deve Gowda became India’s eleventh
Prime Minister and held office between June 1996 and April
1997. He promulgated twenty-three ordinances in those eleven
months.108 Inder K. Gujral took over as Prime Minister after
Deve Gowda resigned, and ran another minority government.
He also held office for eleven months and was responsible for
another twenty-three ordinances.109 The two cabinets jointly
promulgated forty-six ordinances during their twenty-two
months in office. In the same period, they legislated no more
than sixty-one acts. When put side by side, these figures reveal
the extent to which ordinances were systematically used to legislate without Parliament. Ordinances were “necessary” for
these cabinets, though not in the sense of Article 123. Rather,
they filled a political void brought about by fractured electoral
verdicts and the cabinets’ inability to develop a network of support from parliamentary friends and foes alike.
Fourth, occasionally cabinets may rely on ordinances simply
because they are convenient. They are convenient in the sense
that the ordinance in question is a relatively uncontroversial
one—and unlikely to generate objections. We may refer to them
as “convenient ordinances.” The creation of the National Human Rights Commission (“NHRC”) is a good example. The
NHRC is a statutory body with the authority to inquire into
allegations of human rights abuse, review legislative and constitutional safeguards, study international treaties and conventions, and promote human rights literacy in India.110 Yet an

108. PRESIDENTIAL ORDINANCES, 1950–2009, supra note 16.
109. Id.
110. The Protection of Human Rights Act, No. 12 of 1993, INDIA CODE. In its
early days, the Commission, it must be mentioned, was viewed with grave
suspicion. See, e.g. Human Rights Panel a ‘Fraud on People,’ TIMES INDIA,
Dec. 8, 1993, at 11; Parliament Okays Rights Bill, TIMES INDIA, Dec. 23, 1993,
at 11. For a more optimistic early assessment, see To Right Wrongs, TIMES
INDIA, Oct. 4, 1993, at 14.
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ordinance was used to establish it.111 Senior officials boasted of
the law’s deliberated status while explaining its salient features at a news conference. It was “an entirely new kind of legislation,” they claimed, “drafted after sixteen months of intense
discussions.”112 “All shades of public opinion” were heard, including consultations with federal ministries and state governments.113 If true, these expansive briefings take away the
very justification for the ordinance. Something written, reviewed, and revised over a period of sixteen months cannot
plausibly claim the mantle of urgency. Perhaps the ordinance
was “necessary” only in the sense that it was convenient and
assured of a parliamentary majority in due course.
As this typology suggests, a wide variety of motives propel
ordinances to life. By favoring an understanding of “necessity”
not grounded in Article 123, these motives undermine the basic
norm that primary legislation must satisfy certain representative, numeric, and deliberative criteria. But more importantly,
they reveal the hollowness of the preconditions. Recall that two
conditions must be satisfied before ordinances may be promulgated. At least one House of Parliament must not be in session,
and the president should be satisfied that circumstances make
it necessary to do so. But these, we now know, are mere formalities. A functioning Parliament may be prorogued at any time
for any reason, and the cabinet may recommend an ordinance
for any reason at all. As a result, there are no ex ante constraints on invoking Article 123. Effectively, there are two distinct sources of primary legislation in India—the Parliament
and the president. They function independently but also often
cross purposes with one another.
II. KEEPING ORDINANCES IN EFFECT: A ROGUE METHOD
EXPLAINED
The argument that there are two distinct sources of primary
legislation does not necessarily imply that there are two Parliaments. Whether presidential and parliamentary legislation
equate to one another will depend on events post-promulgation.
Ordinances under Article 123 are temporary provisions of law.
111. The Protection of Human Rights Ordinance, 1993, No. 30 of 1993 (India).
112. Human Rights Body to Be Set Up, TIMES INDIA, Sept. 30, 1993, at 1.
113. Id.
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They remain in effect for six weeks from the day the two Houses reconvene and must be converted into an act within this duration.114 This is a critical hurdle; the “Two Parliaments” argument cannot succeed without overcoming it. There are two
mechanisms by which to overcome this hurdle. This section
discusses the empirical record of ordinances post-promulgation
and focuses on the first mechanism; namely, repromulgation.
A. What Happens after Promulgation: Five Possibilities
Once promulgated, every ordinance, in keeping with Article
123(2), must be laid “before both Houses.”115 Four outcomes are
largely possible at this stage. First, the ordinance may become
an Act through the normal legislative procedure. This is the
best-case scenario from the cabinet’s point of view. It must be
done within six weeks of the reassembly of the two Houses.116
Second, the ordinance may be put to vote, but “disapproved” by
one or both Houses. It is the worst-case scenario from the cabinet’s point of view. The ordinance immediately “ceases to operate” in such a case.117 Third, the cabinet may decide against
putting the ordinance to a vote at all. That is to say, it may let
the ordinance “lapse.” Lastly, the cabinet may withdraw an ordinance.118 These four possibilities fall into two broad categories. The first outcome is the successful one; the ordinance becomes an act. Though for different reasons, the other three outcomes share an unsuccessful quality. In each of those cases, an
ordinance ends as an ordinance; it does not become an act. Parenthetically, it may be noted that a fifth outcome is also possible. If a cabinet so chooses, it may repromulgate an unsuccessful ordinance after the reassembled Houses are no longer in
session. But a repromulgated ordinance is still an ordinance
and will eventually meet one of the four outcomes mentioned
earlier.
Table A lists the ways in which Parliament has responded to
ordinances thus far. Of the 615 ordinances, 478 (77.7%) “succeeded;” they became acts. Of the “unsuccessful” ones, seventyfive (12.1%) expired (or lapsed); fifty-nine (9.5%) were reprom114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

INDIA CONST. art.123(2)(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art.123(2)(b).
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ulgated; and two (.003%) were withdrawn.119 These numbers,
when plotted by decade, show a marginal decline in the percentage of successful ordinances. The 1950s had the lowest
number of ordinances and nearly the highest conversion rate:
fifty-two ordinances were promulgated and forty-eight of them
became acts (92.3%). The success rate was 92.5% in the 1960s,
90.3% in the 1970s, 89.2% in the 1980s, and 77.7% in the
2000s. The 1990s is the outlier. Of the 196 ordinances promulgated during that decade, only 107 (54.5%) became acts. As
many as eighty-nine failed, of which thirty-six (18.3%) expired
and another fifty-three (27%) were repromulgated. These low
rates of success were brought about by poor performances in
several years. For example, in 1995, of the fifteen ordinances
promulgated only six became acts. The performance in 1996
was even worse: thirty-two ordinances were promulgated and
only nine became acts. Similarly, in 1997, thirty-one ordinances were promulgated and only eleven became acts. Taken together, the 1990s, in contrast to the 1950s, had the most number of ordinances and the worst conversion rate.
Table A. Parliamentary Responses to Ordinances
1952–1959
1960–1969
1970–1979
1980–1989
1990–1999
2000–2009

Acts
48
62
122
83
107
56

Disapproved
–
–
–
–
–
–

Lapsed
03
05
12
10
36
10

Withdrawn
01
–
01
–
–
–

Repromulgated
–
–
–
–
53
06

Our focus must be on repromulgated ordinances. Repromulgation is the method by which a cabinet may reintroduce an
ordinance upon its lapse, withdrawal, or rejection, and therefore is an important mechanism by which to overcome the
“temporary” hurdle identified previously. As Table A shows,
until the 1990s, the established practice was against repromulgating ordinances. In fact, ordinances had never been repromulgated at the federal level prior to the early 1990s. But that
established practice quickly succumbed to political expediency
when fractured parliamentary verdicts and minority cabinets
119. All figures analyzed here have been calculated based on information
provided in PRESIDENTIAL ORDINANCES, 1950–2009, supra note 16.
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became the norm. Of the 196 ordinances promulgated in the
1990s, as many as fifty-three (27%) were repromulgated, including some that were promulgated twice or more. Though the
trend began in 1992, repromulgation assumed hideous proportions in 1996 and 1997. There were thirty-two ordinances in
1996; of those ordinances, nineteen were repromulgated or repeatedly repromulgated. Similarly, there were thirty-one ordinances in 1997; sixteen were repromulgated and at least seven
were repromulgated twice. Incidentally, they all came from minority cabinets.120
B. Repeated Promulgations: The First Step Toward “Two Parliaments”?
Note that Article 123 says nothing about repromulgation. Its
silence raises two important questions. Is repromulgation valid? Second, are there limits to the number of times an ordinance may be repromulgated? An affirmative answer to the
first question and a negative answer to the second question will
support the argument that there are “Two Parliaments.” It
would imply that the second control—the requirement that an
ordinance be properly enacted as an act—is an empty one. A
cabinet may repeatedly repromulgate an ordinance to confer on
it a kind of permanence normally accorded to acts.
Between 1967 and 1981, the State of Bihar in eastern India
promulgated 256 ordinances that “were kept alive for periods
ranging between one and fourteen years by repromulgation
from time to time.”121 Repromulgated mechanically and strategically, the authorities ensured that the ordinances did not outlive their prescribed tenure.122 In D. C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar,123 the Supreme Court concluded that the practice was,
generally speaking, unconstitutional. Four steps made up most
of the Court’s reasoning: (a) the lawmaking function in the
Constitution is entrusted to the legislature; (b) it is contrary to
democratic norms that the executive should have the power to
120. DAM, supra note 15, at 66–117.
121. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579 (India).
122. For a copy of a circular letter advising repromulgation, see id. para. 5.
For a detailed description of the assiduous manner in which Legislative sessions were timed and their implications for keeping Ordinances alive, see
D.C. WADHWA, RE-PROMULGATION OF ORDINANCES: A FRAUD ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 8–17 (1983).
123. Wadhwa, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579.
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make law; (c) the power to issue ordinances to tide over emergent situations is exceptional and, therefore, must be limited in
point of time; and (d) a contrary view—of allowing the executive to usurp legislative functions—is opposed to India’s “constitutional scheme.”124 The Court’s conclusion, though defensible, is far from uniform. On two separate occasions the Patna
High Court interpreted Article 213 (the state version of Article
123) in favor of repromulgative powers.125 Referring to the
permissibility of repromulgation, in Mathura Prasad Singh v.
State of Bihar126 Singh J. concluded “it is not for the Court to
declare such an Ordinance ultra vires on this score.” If a state
is ruled by successive ordinances, the Legislature may disapprove of the ordinances or the electorate may disapprove of the
conduct of its accredited representatives in promulgating the
ordinances and reject them at the next poll.127
Two aspects in D. C. Wadhwa have attracted attention and
criticism. First, there was a mismatch between the Court’s hortatory denunciation of the practice and its formal order. At various points, Chief Justice Bhagwati was scathing in his assessment of the repromulgative practice. He considered the
“enormity of the situation . . . startling” at one point;128 elsewhere, he anointed the practice as “nothing short of usurpation,”129 a clear “subverting of the democratic process,”130 a
“subterfuge,”131 “reprehensible,”132 and finally, “a fraud on the
Constitution.”133 And yet, this litany of linguistic censures did
not translate into meaningful remedies. Except for invalidating
one of the three ordinances specifically under challenge, the
Supreme Court fell back on “hope and trust that such practice
shall not be continued in the future.”134 It said or did nothing
about the endemic practice that had otherwise taken root in
Bihar. The narrative of subversion, subterfuge, and fraud,
124. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
125. Chakradharpur Biri v. State of Bihar, (1973) 32 S.T.C. 573 (1972) (India); Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1975 Pat. 295.
126. Mathura Singh, A.I.R. 1975 Pat. 295.
127. Id. ¶ 16.
128. Wadhwa, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579, ¶ 4.
129. Id. ¶ 6.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. ¶ 7.
133. Id. ¶ 6.
134. Id. ¶ 7.
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Upendra Baxi says, was inconsistent with the Court’s eventual
“hope and trust” kind of order.135 “Both ‘hope’ and ‘trust’ are
singularly misplaced,” he argues, “in a context where a state
has usurped unconstitutionally the power of the elected representatives of the people.”136
Second, the Court’s conclusion that repromulgation is unconstitutional leaves certain matters unclear. For example, is
repromulgation always unconstitutional? That is unlikely:
Chief Justice Bhagwati himself listed circumstances in which
the executive may be compelled to repromulgate an ordinance.
Of course, there may be a situation where it may not be possible for the Government to introduce and push through in
the Legislature a Bill containing the same provisions as in the
Ordinance, because the Legislature may have too much legislative business . . . or the time at the disposal of the Legislature . . . may be short, and in that event, the Governor may
legitimately find that it is necessary to repromulgate the Ordinance.137

What this exception suggests is that the Court merely invalidated mechanical repromulgation of ordinances, not repromulgation per se. Promulgation (or repromulgation) as an exercise
of original legislative powers requires an application of mind,
not just clerical approval. Repromulgation, in other words,
would be valid if the original emergent conditions persist
alongside adequate reasons for failing to legislate an ordinance
into law. Unlike promulgation, the validity of repromulgation,
therefore, is predicated both on the persistence of emergent
conditions and the availability of reasons as to why an ordinance was not transacted in the intervening legislative session.
It is noteworthy that the Court imposed no restriction on repeated repromulgations; if it could be done once, it could be
done several times.
Our focus must then be on “adequate reasons” that would
justify repromulgation. Chief Justice Bhagwati pointed out
two. First, if the volume of legislative business in the intervening session were such that the cabinet failed to push a bill

135. Uprenda Baxi, Introduction to D.C. WADHWA, RE-PROMULGATION
ORDINANCES: A FRAUD ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, at lxxxvi (1983).
136. Id. at lxxxvii.
137. Wadhwa, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579, ¶ 6.
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through, repromulgation would be acceptable.138 Second, if time
were too short during an intervening session to enact an ordinance into law, repromulgation would also be acceptable.139
Both these options, to some extent, belie the fundamental requirement that an emergency situation must exist for repromulgation. If a legislative emergency truly persists, with a makedo ordinance brought in to tide over it, why should such a matter be treated with low priority? If Parliament does not prioritize ordinance-related matters for reasons of volume or duration, that itself may be a ground to doubt the existence of
emergency conditions.
Unsurprisingly, the exceptions were greeted with skepticism.
A. G. Noorani was personal in his criticism: “When Justice P.
N. Bhagwati retired as the Chief Justice of India even those
who had made it their vocation in recent years to extol his
qualities had to concede that when it came to great power, timidity was his watchword.”140 The exemption carved out by
Chief Justice Bhagwati, Noorani thought, was “wholly gratuitous and rob[bed] the judgment of merit and value.”141 For him,
“[i]t was a case of interpretation and the exception, based on
pure legislative convenience, derive[d] no sanction from Article
213.”142 It was, as he put it, “devoid of any justification.”143 Anil
Nauriya, in his more measured analysis, pointed out the potential incoherence of the propositions.144 Given that the decision
outlawed “only successive repromulgations indulged in as a
practice,” Nauriya argued that the Court had in effect upheld
three contradictory propositions. One, the subjective satisfaction of the president as to whether an ordinance is necessary
remains outside judicial scrutiny. Two, in some cases repromulgation may be constitutionally justifiable, and finally, that
successive repromulgation would be bad.145 If the first and sec-

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. A.G. Noorani, Supreme Court and Ordinances, 22 ECO. & POL. WKLY.
357 (1987).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Jill Cottrell, Re-promulgation of Ordinances in India: A
Note, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1044 (1988) (book review).
144. Anil Nauriya, Indian Judicial Renascence: The Lines Not Crossed, 22
ECO. & POL. WKLY. 239 (1987).
145. Id. at 239.
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ond propositions are valid, the third does not stand up to scrutiny.
If the Supreme Court insists on a set of exceptions to the
general rule against repromulgation, what other reasons apart
from those in D. C. Wadhwa might be valid? Take the case of
POTO, the anti-terror legislation previously mentioned. Support for the ordinance was low from the beginning and even the
government’s coalition partners were hesitant.146 But the
Vajpayee Cabinet repromulgated the ordinance with few
changes.147 That a parliamentary majority had impliedly rebuffed the need for such legislation hardly mattered. Is the absence of legislative support an adequate reason for repromulgating an ordinance? D. C. Wadhwa provides no guidelines in
this regard. It is unclear if Chief Justice Bhagwati’s exceptions
should be read as a closed category.148 The Delhi High Court, it
should be mentioned, chose to read the exceptions widely. In
Gyanendra Kumar v. Union of India,149 the Court used the
Wadhwa exceptions to uphold the validity of ten repromulgated
ordinances. The Solicitor General argued that the ordinances
were tabled in the two Houses, but other pressing and urgent
matters meant that the bills could not be taken up for a full
discussion.150 The High Court accepted that claim without any
further inquiry. Left unsaid was the fact that the minority cabinet did not have the requisite number in the two Houses to
properly legislate the ordinances into acts.
The second control in Article 123 has to do with parliamentary approval: an ordinance does not become permanent unless
Parliament converts it into an act. But the possibility of
repromulgation has watered down that control. To be sure,
repromulgation is nominally unconstitutional. But it is also the
beneficiary of a generous exception; cabinets merely need to
summon the alibi of two Houses burdened with other “urgent
146. V. Venkatesan, POTO and a Stand-Off, FRONTLINE (Dec. 22, 2001),
available at http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl1826/18260190.htm.
147. Prevention of Terrorism (Second) Ordinance, 2001 (12 of 2001) (India);
see also POTO Promulgated with Amendments, TRIBUNE (Dec. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020101/nation.htm#3.
148. For an unconvincing argument that the repromulgation was unconstitutional, see D. Nagasaila & V. Suresh, Repromulgation of POTO: Is It Legal?, 37 ECO. & POL. WKLY. 371 (2002).
149. Kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 Delhi 58 (1996) (India).
150. Id. ¶ 9.
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matters” to invoke it. This way cabinets have an alternative
means by which to make ordinances permanent. Parliamentary
Acts are permanent from the very beginning unless otherwise
stated. Ordinances too are permanent, but with the president’s
periodic intervention. As such, we are well on our way to establishing the “Two Parliaments” argument. The next section explores the second aspect of permanence, which has to do with
the effect of failed ordinances.
III. SUCCESS IN FAILURE: THE AFTERLIFE OF FAILED
ORDINANCES
The previous sections have shown that the president in India
may promulgate an ordinance effectively at any time for any
reason. Such an ordinance may be made effectively permanent
simply by repromulgating it repeatedly. But Article 123 has a
third control, and we must consider its effectiveness before
rendering a final verdict. It has to do with failed ordinances.
Since Parliament may reject an ordinance, some ordinances do
not become acts. Also, the president may withdraw an ordinance, or it may simply lapse. In all such cases, what happens
to the validity of actions taken while the ordinances were in
force?
Article 123(2) says that failed ordinances “cease to operate.”151 In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Bose,152 the Supreme
Court turned its attention to this clause: What does it mean to
say that an ordinance “ceases to operate?” The petitioner challenged the results of an election to a local municipal body on
the ground that the election did not comply with procedural
requirements. The High Court agreed and invalidated the result. Alarmed by the possibility that elections to other municipal bodies may also be invalidated, the governor promulgated
an ordinance.153 Electoral laws were retrospectively amended
to override the High Court’s reasoning and judgment. But the
ordinance did not become permanent; the State Assembly
failed to convert it into an act.154 Consequently, the ordinance
lapsed and ceased to operate. Did this lapse revive the High
151.
152.
153.
dia).
154.

INDIA CONST. art. 123(2)(a).
State of Orissa v. Bose, (1962) A.I.R. 945 (1961) (India).
Orissa Municipal Elections Validation Ordinance, 1959 (1 of 1959) (InBose, (1962) A.I.R. 945, ¶ 2.

2014]

INDIA'S TWO PARLIAMENTS

641

Court’s earlier decision invalidating the elections—the very
thing that led the governor to promulgate the ordinance? The
Supreme Court said no. And the Court’s reasoning has important implications for the “Two Parliaments” argument.
The Court began by looking at the effect of temporary acts.
Based on a quick survey of three English decisions,155 Chief
Justice Chandrachud concluded that no inflexible rule could be
laid down regarding the effects of a temporary act.156 As he put
it, at least in some cases, “repeal effected by a temporary act
would be permanent and would endure even after the expiration of the temporary act.”157 The precise nature of the effect,
he said, “must depend upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provisions of the temporary act and upon their character whether the said right and liability are enduring or not.”158 And keeping in mind “the object of the Ordinance and the right created by the validating provisions,” the
Court concluded that it “must be held to endure and last even
after the expiry of the Ordinance.”159
The reasoning was reiterated in Venkata Reddy v. State of
Andhra Pradesh.160 The governor promulgated the Andhra
Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Ordinance, 1984, to abolish the post of part-time Village Officers
and to create a new category of posts referred to as “Village Assistants.”161 The ordinance, despite a series of repromulgations,
lapsed; the State Assembly refused to enact it. The petitioner,
previously a part-time Village Officer, argued that the Ordinance having lapsed, his earlier post stood revived. The Supreme Court rejected that claim. Chief Justice Chandrachud
once again came to the conclusion that failed ordinances do not
become void retrospectively.162 Article 123(2) says that a failed
ordinance “shall cease to operate,” and that, he said, “only
means that it should be treated as being effective till it ceases
155. Steavenson v. Oliver, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1024 (Eng.), 8 Meeson &
Welsby 234; Warren v. Windle, (1803) 102 Eng. Rep. 576 (K.B.); Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1947) A.C. 362 (H.L.) (U.K.).
156. Bose, (1962) A.I.R. 945, ¶ 22.
157. Id. ¶ 22.
158. Id. ¶ 21.
159. Id. ¶ 23.
160. Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 724 (India).
161. Id. ¶ 1.
162. Id. ¶ 18.
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to operate on the happening of the events mentioned in [the
provision].”163 The part-time posts stood abolished on the date
on which the Ordinance was promulgated, and its effects are
irreversible except by new legislation.164 Parliament and State
Legislatures are not powerless to undo the effects of failed ordinances; but only new acts can achieve such corrections with
retrospective effect. Chief Justice Chandrachud concluded that
new acts are the only way to revive “closed or completed transactions” generated under a failed ordinance.165
The implications are stark. The reasoning elevates the status
of ordinances to temporary acts. That is, an ordinance is an act
with a sunset clause. And because the Court interprets the effects of failed ordinances through the prism of temporary acts,
it has the implied effect of privileging presidential legislation
over parliamentary legislation. In Venkata Reddy, for example,
the post of part-time Village Officer was created by an act.166
The ordinance that abolished it lapsed. But it still generated a
permanent state of affairs. Only a new act, the Court says, can
revise this new state of affairs. This implies that the president
may negate statutorily conferred rights and duties merely by
issuing ordinances. Their effects, however, can be undone only
by acts of Parliament.
Consider what this means for repeal by an ordinance. Parliament, in the exercise of its legislative power, may repeal legislation; ordinances, therefore, may also do so.167 Let us assume
that an ordinance repeals an existing piece of legislation but
lapses.168 Does that lapse revive the repealed act? A temporary
act on its expiry does not revive the repealed law unless specifically provided for in the act itself.169 And if an ordinance is
constitutionally equivalent to a temporary act, as the Supreme
Court says it is, a lapse will have no effect. The repealed act
would remain permanently repealed unless subsequently re163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. ¶ 19.
166. Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, No. 3 of 1895, INDIA CODE.
167. King-Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma, (1944) 72 I.A. 57 (India).
168. See, e.g., Saurashtra (Abolition of Local Sea Customs Duties and Imposition of) Port Development Levy Repealing Ordinance, 1952, No. 4 of 1952
(India); Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publication) Repeal Ordinance, 1975, No. 25 of 1975 (India).
169. Krishnan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 301 (India).
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vived by a new act. The implication is obvious: the president
acting independently can permanently repeal a piece of parliamentary legislation.
This manner of reasoning has effectively undone the third
control—the requirement that a failed ordinance must “cease to
operate.” To Chief Justice Chandrachud, the cessation requirement meant that an ordinance “should be treated as being
effective till it ceases to operate on the happening of the events
mentioned in [the provision].”170 In other words, all actions
taken during the period when an ordinance is in force remain
valid forever. In Bhupendra Bose, the petitioner’s electoral loss
remained permanent.171 Similarly, in Venkata Reddy the failed
ordinance permanently destroyed the part-time posts for some.
What this means is that an ordinance, when it ‘ceases to operate,’ does not really cease to operate. Take the case of a university. In India, a university can only be established by an
act.172 An ordinance therefore can also establish a university.173
Let us assume that the ordinance lapses months later. In addition, let us assume that the university had achieved several
things in those six months. It may have, for example, put in
place an academic infrastructure sufficient to commence functioning, secured approvals for some courses, completed the first
round of admissions, and started introductory classes. What
would be the legal effect of this lapse? Nothing, if the Supreme
Court is correct. The university will continue as if the ordinance is permanently valid.
The dramatic implications of this interpretation are made
clear by the case of Mohammad Afroze and his prosecution under the dreaded POTO. Afroze was arrested in Mumbai on October 2001 and initially charged with robbery.174 The police later claimed that he was an al-Qaida agent; he had been conspiring to crash a plane into the British House of Commons.175 To
170. State of Orissa v. Bose, (1962) A.I.R. 945, ¶ 18 (1961) (India).
171. Id.
172. Jain v. Chhabra, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 883 (India).
173. See e.g. The Manipur University Ordinance, 2005, No. 2 of 2005 (India). Note that this was a case of converting a State University into a Central
University, not a proper case of an ordinance establishing a new university
entirely.
174. Ranjit Khomne, Afroze Likely to Be Booked under POTO, TIMES INDIA,
Jan. 3, 2002, at 3.
175. ‘Afroze Was Part of Al Qaida Hit Squad,’ TIMES INDIA, Mar. 28, 2002,
at 3.
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unearth the details of what the Mumbai police referred to as an
“international conspiracy,” senior officers went to Australia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States for further ‘‘investigations.”176 However, less than four weeks after he was formally charged, the public prosecutor reversed his position. He
requested to the trial court that the POTO charges be
dropped.177 There was no evidence to prosecute the accused under that ordinance. That same day Scotland Yard categorically
dismissed claims of any plot to attack the British Parliament.178 With no corroborating evidence to back up Afroze’s socalled confession, the special prosecutor in the case admitted to
a “bona fide error of judgment” in applying the POTO.179 Afroze
was charged under the POTO at a time when there was a real
possibility that the Vajpayee Cabinet would fail to translate
the ordinance into an act for a second time. What if the ordinance had failed a second time? It would have made no difference for Mohammad Afroze. As senior counsel, P.R. Vakil rightly pointed out that the cabinet’s failure to enact POTO into an
act would not have affected cases already under way.180 Afroze,
in other words, could be arrested, tried, and even sentenced to
life in prison or death in pursuance of presidential legislation,
so long as the process began while the ordinance was still in
force. None of this unfolded because the police retracted their
claims. However, if the Vajpayee Cabinet had failed to get
POTO enacted and the police had persisted with their original
charges, the invasive potential of presidential legislation would
have come into sharp focus.
The third control in Article 123 has endured a common fate.
Like the previous two, the control is in the provision but effec176. Afroze is the First to Be Booked under POTO in State, TIMES INDIA,
Mar. 9, 2002, at 2.
177. Public Prosecutor Says Police Didn’t Consult Him about POTO Charges, TIMES INDIA, Mar. 27, 2002, at 2.
178. Sanjay Suri, Scotland Yard Dismisses Mumbai Police’s Claims on Afroze, TIMES INDIA, Mar. 28, 2002, at 11.
179. Mohammed Afroze Finally Gets a Taste of Freedom, TIMES INDIA, Apr.
10,
2002,
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2002-0410/mumbai/27139613_1_mohammed-afroz-sessions-court-nikam.
180. Ranjit Khomne, Cases under POTO Will Stay Even if the Bill Is DefeatINDIA,
Mar.
22,
2002,
ed,
TIMES
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2002-0322/mumbai/27119339_1_poto-afroze-trombay-based-transporter-abdulrazzak.
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tively not part of it. Under existing interpretations, a failed ordinance retains its legal rigor, and functions as if it is legislation proper. As such, parliamentary preeminence, it has to be
said, is no longer part of India’s legislative design.
IV. PRESIDENTIAL PREEMINENCE: NOTES FROM COMPARATIVE
DESIGN
Effectively, India’s president may promulgate any law at any
time for any reason. When promulgated, such laws are permanent. That presidents should have such extensive legislative
powers in an otherwise parliamentary system is something of
an anomaly. But such arrangements are not uncommon in
presidential systems. Jurisdictions in Eastern and Western
Europe, Africa, and Latin America frequently endow their presidents with a range of legislative—or, decree—powers.181 This
penultimate section offers a bird’s eye view of decree powers in
presidential systems, and situates the Indian experience within
the broader literature.
John Carey and Matthew Shugart’s edited volume on decree
authority is perhaps the most comprehensive comparative
treatment of the subject.182 Ten contributors assessed the evolution and exercise of such powers in eight jurisdictions and, in
the process, tested a set of hypotheses offered by the editors.
Four of those jurisdictions are Latin American (Argentina,
Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela), while two are West European
(Italy and France). Russia and the United States made up the
remaining two. With the exception of Italy and France, the rest
181. For an introductory overview of “decree powers,” as it is commonly referred to, see José Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi, LegislativeExecutive Relations, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 211, 226–29 (Tom
Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); Matthew S. Shugart & John M. Carey, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL
DYNAMICS 131–47 (1992); see also John M. Carey, Presidential versus Parliamentary Government, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 91,
103–07 (C. Menard & M.M. Shirley eds., 2005).
182. EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY (John M. Carey & Matthew S. Shugart
eds., 1998). For an introduction to decree powers, see John M. Carey & Matthew S. Shugart, Calling Out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms?, in
EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra, at 1, 3; see also José Antonio Cheibub,
Zachary Elkins, & Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism and ParliamentarJ.
POL.
SCI.
(2013)
(forthcoming),
available
at
ism,
BRIT.
http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/22250/cheibub%20elk
ins%20ginsburg%20beyond%20presidentialism.pdf?sequence=3.
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are thoroughly presidential systems and that fact colored the
prism through which the contributors presented and evaluated
their arguments.
Carey and Shugart offer a two-by-two matrix to explain the
various ways in which presidential decree authority can be
constitutionally entrenched.183 They focus on two aspects: permanence and timing. Are decrees permanent? Do they come
into effect immediately? These two variables generate four possibilities, as shown below.184
Decree becomes permanent law?
YES

Decree in effect
immediately?

YES

NO

NO

Russia (Art. 90)
Peru ‘93 (Art. 118:19)
Colombia ‘91 (Art. 215)
Chile ‘89 (Art. 32: 22)

Brazil ‘88 (Art. 62)
Italy (Art. 77)
Colombia ‘91 (Art. 213)
France (Art. 16)

Ecuador (Art. 65)
France (Art. 49:3)

NA

Carey and Shugart argue that Russia, Peru, Colombia, and
Chile are examples of the strongest possibility for presidential
decree authority.185 Presidential decrees in these jurisdictions
are permanent and they enjoy immediate effect—the “prototypical” decree authority.186 Because they are permanent, decrees
can be parliamentarily undone only through contrary legislation. The immediate effect of the decrees means that the legislative branch has no influence over them prior to their promulgation; parliamentary response, if any, is always ex post. However, such powers often come with some additional limits. Article 90 in Russia’s Constitution, for example, authorizes the
president to issue “edicts and regulations” provided they do
“not conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation

183. EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 10.
184. Note that many of the constitutions listed in the table have since been
amended, including provisions on decree power. But Carey and Shugart’s
basic claims still hold, and the table still organizes the information in a way
that is relevant.
185. EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 10.
186. Id.
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and federal laws.”187 Similarly, in Peru, the president can exercise such power only “on economic and financial matters, when
so required by the national interest.”188 While prototypical decree authority means that there are two distinct paths to primary legislation, parliament and the president do not always
enjoy similar legislative standing.
A second, and somewhat less strong, possibility is what Carey
and Shugart refer to as “provisional” decree authority, whereby
decrees take immediate effect but lapse after some designated
period unless ratified by the legislature.189 Article 62 in Brazil’s
Constitution, for example, provides that presidential decrees
shall lapse after sixty days unless “converted into law” by Congress.190 In neighboring Argentina, the Chief of the Ministerial
Cabinet must personally submit, within ten days, promulgated
decrees to the Joint Standing Committee of Congress for its
consideration.191 The Committee must make a report to both
187. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art.
90(3) (Russ.).
188. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ (1993) art. 118(19) (Peru) (“It is the
duty of the President . . . to promulgate special measures in economic and
financial subject, through emergency decree with force of law, as required by
national interest and reporting to Congress. Such emergency decrees may be
modified or repealed by Congress.”).
189. EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 11.
190. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 62(3) (Braz.)
(“[P]rovisional measures shall lose effectiveness from the day of their issuance if they are not converted into law within a period of sixty days, which
may be extended once for an identical period of time.”). There is a burgeoning
literature on decree authority in Brazil. See, e.g., Timothy Power, The Pen Is
Mightier Than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil, in
EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 197, 204; Gabriel L. Negretto, Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America:
The Cases of Brazil and Argentina, 37 COMP. POL. STUD. 531 (2004); Carlos
Pereira, Timothy J. Power & Lucio Rennó, Under What Conditions Do Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Theory and Evidence from the Brazilian Case,
67 J. POL. 178 (2005); Gary Reich, Executive Decree Authority in Brazil: How
Reactive Legislators Influence Policy, 27 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (2002); Carlos Pereira, Timothy J. Power & Lucio Rennó, Agenda Power, Executive Decree Authority, and the Mixed Results of Reform in the Brazilian Congress, 33 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 5 (2008).
191. Art. 99(3), CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.)
Only when due to exceptional circumstances the ordinary procedures
foreseen by this Constitution for the enactment of laws are impossible to be followed, and when rules are not referred to criminal issues,
taxation, electoral matters, or the system of political parties, he shall
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Houses of Congress where it is immediately discussed.192
Whether a ratification requirement limits a president’s ability
to initiate long-term change depends in part on the legality of
reissuing such decrees. If presidents are authorized to repromulgate decrees, legislative opposition to such measures may not
mean much. However, the effectiveness of the ratification requirement also depends on “clean-up costs.”193 If it is disproportionately costly to undo presidential initiatives, legislatures
may ratify them despite their opposition to such measures.194
Therefore, depending on how and why decrees are issued (and
reissued), countries with provisional decree authority may, in
effect, function like those with prototypical decree authority.
A third and still less strong possibility is what Carey and
Shugart refer to as “delayed” decree authority.195 As the name
suggests, such decrees do not take immediate effect. Instead,
they become permanent law in the absence of legislative action.196 This arrangement offers the legislative branch an opportunity to prohibit decrees from coming into effect or to alter
their content before authorizing them. The scrutiny, if any, is
ex ante. In Ecuador, the president can propose legislation by
declaring it “urgent,” and if the National Assembly fails to act
within thirty days, the decree becomes law.197 The Assembly,
issue decrees on grounds of necessity and urgency, which shall be
decided by a general agreement of ministers who shall countersign
them together with the Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet.
Id.
192. Id.; see Delia Ferreira Rubio & Matteo Goretti, When the President
Governs Alone: The Decretazo in Argentina 1989–93, in EXECUTIVE DECREE
AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 33. There is some controversy about the numbers. President Menem issued more than 13,500 during the period in question, but the vast majority of these “decrees” were in effect delegated legislation and therefore not the kind of legislation we are concerned about in this
book. Rubio and Gorreti argue that of the more than 13,500 decrees, 336 of
them may be classified as constitutional decrees, which are effectively primary legislation “enacted” by the executive. Id. at 43.
193. EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 12.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 12.
196. Id. at 11.
197. CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION
OF ECUADOR] art. 140 (“The President of the Republic will be able to send to
the National Assembly bills qualified as urgent on economic matters. The
Assembly must adopt, amend or turn them down within thirty (30) days at
the most as of their reception.”).
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nonetheless, retains the competence to amend or repeal such
decrees at a later point in time.198 Under Ecuadorian rules, the
president may send only one “urgent” decree to the Assembly
at a time.199 Similarly, France’s guillotine procedure may also
be read as an example of delayed decree authority. There, if
parliament rejects the executive’s proposal, then the government falls; but if parliament takes no action, the decree becomes law.200 Consistent with France’s semi-presidential arrangement, the authority over the guillotine is vested in the
French premier rather than the president.201 The effectiveness
of delaying the implementation of decrees depends, in part, on
legislators’ willingness to challenge the president (or the parliamentary head). Because an affirmative vote is required to
prevent an executive measure from becoming law, legislators
can “authorize” a decree simply by refusing to act on it.202 In
such cases, delayed decree authority can effectively transform
into prototypical decree authority.
Such a transformation is evident in India. India’s Article 123,
in its original form, conferred “provisional” decree authority.203
Ordinances come into effect immediately but lapse after a specified duration unless properly enacted by Parliament.204 In its
applied form, however, Article 123 effectively functions as a
prototypical authority; a combination of the constitutional text,
political context, and judicial subtext made this alchemy possible. First, ordinances come into effect immediately. Textually,
they can be promulgated only when either House of Parliament
198. Id.
When the Assembly does not adopt, amend or turn down the bill
qualified as urgent in economic matters within the stipulated timelimits, the President of the Republic shall enact it as a decree-law or
shall order its publication in the Official Register. The National Assembly shall be able, at any time, to amend or repeal it, on the basis
of the regular process provided for by the Constitution.
Id.
199. Id.
200. (1958) CONST. art. 49 (Fra.) (“The Prime Minister, after deliberation by
the Council of Ministers, may make the Government’s programme or possibly
a general policy statement an issue of a vote of confidence before the National
Assembly.”).
201. EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 13.
202. Id.
203. INDIA CONST. art. 123.
204. Id. art. 123
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is not in session. However, this limitation does not apply in
practice.205 Second, lapsed ordinances may be repromulgated,
thereby conferring quasi-permanence on such legislation.
While the Supreme Court has declared such practice nominally
unconstitutional, it also carved out wide exceptions. Those exceptions make it legal to repromulgate ordinances endlessly.
There are effectively no limits on the number of times ordinances can be repromulgated. Third, recall that prototypical
decree authority, as Carey and Shugart claimed, often comes
with substantive restrictions. In Russia, for example, the president may issue “edicts” only to the extent that they do not contravene federal laws.206 Similarly, in Peru, the president may
invoke this authority only in specified matters.207 In India,
however, there are no subject matter limitations. Article 123(3)
makes this clear: “If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament would not under
this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.”208 In
other words, the president may promulgate an ordinance on
any subject matter on which Parliament is competent to enact
legislation. Taken together, these attributes suggest that India
functions as a prototypical decree regime. There are two parliaments in other words, with the president acting as a parallel
parliament. More importantly, these attributes suggest that
India’s prototypical arrangement is one of the strongest in the
world, much stronger than many in presidential systems.
Prototypical decree authority is commonly associated with
unilateral presidential action and, occasionally, constitutional
breakdowns. In Russia, provisions for an independently elected
president and decree authority were first introduced in 1991.209
Almost immediately after taking office on July 20, 1991, President Boris Yeltsin invoked the provision to ban, among other
things, “political activity” within state institutions during office
hours.210 While he justified the decree as an attempt to ensure
205. See supra Part II.
206. EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182.
207. Id.
208. INDIA CONST. art. 123(3).
209. Scott Parrish, Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991–95, in
EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 62; see also Thomas F. Remington, Steven S. Smith & Moshe Haspel, Decrees, Laws, and Inter-Branch
Relations in the Russian Federation, 14 POST-SOVIET AFF. 287 (1998).
210. Parrish, supra note 209, at 69.
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“equal rights of political parties,” the Constitutional Court, under controversial circumstances, invalidated parts of it.211 In
1994, a new Constitution gave the president even wider legislative powers.212 Decrees under Article 90, as previously mentioned, have the force of law, come into effect immediately upon
publication, and are obligatory on all levels of government.213
While presidential decrees may be overridden by parliamentary legislation, the president also has veto power. As a result,
the president’s decrees may be repealed or amended only with
the support of a two-third majority in each house of the Federal
Assembly of Russia.214 President Yeltsin took advantage of this
new arrangement to introduce decrees to combat organized
crime, partially privatize the airwaves and the state-owned television broadcasting corporation, and introduce pension reforms.215 These decrees often faced parliamentary opposition,
with members at times enacting contrary legislation for Yeltsin
to sign.216 But the divided body could not muster enough votes
to overcome his veto.217 Yeltsin’s choices, therefore, remained in
effect except on rare occasions when he agreed to compromise
with Parliament.218
The developments in Peru in the early years of the Fujimori
administration are also a good example of how prototypical decree authority can precipitate a full-blown constitutional crisis.
In 1990, Alberto Fujimori came to power with a landslide victo211. Id. at 69–71.
212. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art.
90 (Russ.).
213. Id.
214. Id. art. 105(5).
In the event that the State Duma disagrees with the decision of the
Council of Federation, a federal law shall be considered to have been
adopted if in the second vote not less than two thirds of the total
number of deputies of the State Duma has voted in favour of it.
Id.
215. Parrish, supra note 209, at 84–92.
216. Id.
217. For an analysis of Russia’s divided parliament in the 1990s, see
THOMAS F. REMINGTON, THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT: INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
IN A TRANSITIONAL REGIME, 1989–1999 (2001).
218. Parrish, supra note 209, at 90–91. There is some evidence to suggest
that the reliance on decrees has decreased from the early 1990s to the early
2000s. See Oleh Protsky, Ruling with Decrees: Presidential Decree Making in
Russia and Ukraine, 56 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 637 (2004).
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ry but faced a thoroughly fragmented Congress.219 With the aid
of delegated decree authority (that is, legislation passed by
Congress authorizing presidential action), Fujimori enacted
decrees in response to the economic crisis sweeping Peru during the period.220 But it was his counterinsurgency decrees that
faced stiff opposition in the legislative chambers; the provisions, many legislators alleged, threatened civil liberties and
democratic governance. Of the 117 decrees on economic and
counterinsurgency issues, Congress repealed sixteen, modified
fourteen, and delayed action on nine of them.221 It also enacted
legislation, overriding a presidential veto that asserted congressional authority over the president’s legislative powers.222
Faced with the prospect of greater congressional scrutiny over
his public, and some private, affairs, President Fujimori called
out the tanks, closed, and later dissolved Congress. Peru’s 1993
Constitution made significant changes to presidential decree
authority, and there is evidence to suggest that the number of
decrees and conflicts has decreased over the years.223
India, however, stands in contrast. Severe conflicts, or constitutional breakdowns, associated with presidential jurisdictions
and decree power are unknown in the country. Given India’s
parliamentary arrangement, both legislation and ordinances
originate from the same source: the cabinet. Parliamentary legislation originates in the cabinet, is voted upon in both Houses
of Parliament, and is finally assented to by the president. Ordinances also originate in the cabinet, but are directly promulgated by the president. The two Houses of Parliament are not
involved. This shared origin explains the absence of institutional conflict in India. At least in the conventional view, there
is no competing office that can challenge the cabinet’s institu-

219. Gregory Schmitt, Presidential Usurpation or Congressional Preference?
The Evolution of Executive Decree Authority in Peru, in EXECUTIVE DECREE
AUTHORITY, supra note 182, at 104.
220. For an overview of the period, see Philip Mauceri, An Authoritarian
Presidency: How and Why Did Presidential Power Run Amok in Fujimori’s
Peru, in THE FUJIMORI LEGACY: THE RISE OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN
PERU 39–60 (Julio Carrión ed., 2006).
221. Gregory Schmitt, supra note 219.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 127–129.
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tional competence to midwife ordinances.224 To be sure, substantive conflicts are common with opposition parties routinely
disagreeing about the necessity of particular ordinances. Their
parliamentary resources, however, are limited and mostly procedural. They may table statutory resolutions disapproving ordinances or press for amendment motions.225 But they have no
guns or tanks to call out. In the Indian system, opposition parties can only oppose, not obstruct, the promulgation of ordinances. All things being equal, cabinets will have their way.
This is true even of minority cabinets. The salience of prototypical decree authority in India, therefore, perhaps has to do with
Parliament’s procedural importance. Does it matter that the
parliamentary process ordinarily involves large numbers of legislators? Do parliamentary debates matter? Does open voting
in a public forum matter? In short, does an open, public, and
elaborate parliamentary procedure matter to the legislative
process?226 At their best, parliamentary legislation enjoys these
qualities, but ordinances, even at their best, do not. And that is
the key challenge India’s “second” Parliament raises.
CONCLUSION
Jyoti Singh endured heinous brutality. Demanding prompt
action against her assailants, India’s collective disgust rightly
spilled over to the streets. But the president’s hasty ordinance
proclaiming death penalty for rapists is emblematic of the larger challenges that this “Alternative Parliament” poses. First,
consider the timing. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013 was promulgated on February 3.227 The two Houses of Parliament assembled for the budget session on February

224. I have argued elsewhere the powers of India’s president should be interpreted so as to offer him or her an institutional basis to obstruct the
promulgation of ordinances. See DAM, supra note 15.
225. LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT, MOTIONS AND RESOLUTIONS IN PARLIAMENT
(2009), http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/Motions%20and%20Resolutions.pdf.
226. For an argument about the philosophical importance of an open debate
and voting in a multi-member body to the legislative process, see Jeremy
Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 664 (1995); see also
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (2000).
(Feb.
04,
2013),
227. New
Anti-Rape
Legislation,
NDTV
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/new-anti-rape-legislation-criminal-lawamendment-ordinance-2013-326240.
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21.228 It is far from clear that the ordinance was “necessary”
except to offer the impression of a cabinet in charge. Next, consider the changes introduced. The ordinance made three significant changes to criminal law in India. It did away with the
term “rape”; “sexual assault” took its place.229 And the latter
was made gender neutral in some respects.230 Most critically,
the ordinance introduced the death penalty for certain categories of sexual assault.231 Some of these changes were problematic, but all were important, and a hasty promulgation offered
little possibility of a thoughtful consideration. Finally, consider
the retractions made. Soon after it was promulgated, news
trickled out that the cabinet was divided.232 As the ordinance
moved through the two Houses, several reversals were made.
The term “rape” returned, and in its gendered form; women
could no longer perpetrate it.233 New crimes were added, but
with mangled definitions.234 The cabinet offered no meaningful
rationale for the dramatic changes in February and its still
more dramatic reversal a month later. It is almost as if the
mechanism allows cabinets to legislate first and reflect later.
That hardly bodes well for India’s parliamentary tradition.
Abetted by aggressive political use and alchemic interpretations, the exceptional and temporary arrangement in Article
123 is now normal and permanent. India’s president, acting
through the cabinet, may effectively enact any legislation at
any time for any reason. He or she may make it permanent by
repeatedly repromulgating it. And even if the two Houses of
Parliament express their collective judgment against such a
piece of legislation, its effects endure. Indeed, if the Supreme
Court is correct, it may permanently repeal any parliamentary
228. Press Release, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Pre-Budget Session
(Jan. 18, 2013), available at http://mpa.nic.in/preb13.pdf.
229. Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013, No. 3 of 2013, § 8 (repealed) (India).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Smita Gupta, Cabinet Divided on Anti-Rape Draft Law, HINDU,
Mar. 13, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cabinet-divided-onantirape-draft-law/article4500256.ece; Law, Home Ministries Not Split on
Anti-Rape Bill: Ashwani Kumar, INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 10, 2013,
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/law-home-ministries-not-split-onantirape-bill-ashwani-kumar/1085892/.
233. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2013, INDIA CODE, § 7.
234. Id. § 9.
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legislation. The conclusion then is unavoidable: India has two
Parliaments. The president and his or her cabinet act as an independent Parliament. When analyzed in comparative context,
it becomes clear that India’s “second” Parliament is one of the
strongest in the world—much stronger than those in many
presidential jurisdictions.
If correct, this analysis raises a paradox. It began by suggesting that ordinances have a large presence in India’s legislative
landscape; there are too many of them. Since 1952, presidents
have promulgated more than ten ordinances every year on average. That adds up to 615 ordinances between 1952 and 2009.
But once the legal architecture surrounding ordinances becomes clear, and it shines through that there are no legal costs
to promulgating ordinances and that even failed ordinances
count as a success, that suggestion should be revised. Perhaps
the question should be: Why so few ordinances? Not why so
many. And that is a question worth paying attention to.

